Somalia’s fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia is increasingly relying on bilateral military partnerships alongside the African Union mission, raising concerns about operational coordination, long-term security and the country’s dependence on foreign forces.
The emerging approach, described as the “bilateralisation” of the war, combines Somali-led ground operations with direct military assistance from foreign governments, including Uganda, Ethiopia, the United States and Türkiye.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Freddie Grounds, in an analysis of Somalia’s evolving security operations, said the model offered tactical advantages but raised questions about coordination, sustainability and the future role of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
In March 2026, Somali National Army troops, supported by AUSSOM’s Ugandan contingent and international partners, announced the recapture of Mubarak and Daarusalaam in the Lower Shabelle region.
Further operations in April targeted additional insurgent positions, with AUSSOM reporting air support and coordinated ground action.
The United States has also maintained an extensive counterterrorism air campaign. On October 17, the US Africa Command confirmed an airstrike targeting Al-Shabaab near Dhooble Airport in southern Somalia.
According to AFRICOM’s published register, 88 airstrikes had been recorded in Somalia in 2026 at the time of writing, targeting Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
However, the available information does not establish that US aircraft directly supported every successful ground operation.
Türkiye has also expanded its military relationship with Somalia through defence cooperation, training and the deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft, publicly demonstrated in April 2026.
The presence of Turkish aircraft, however, does not independently confirm their involvement in the specific operations in Lower Shabelle.
Bilateral troop deployments have further complicated the security landscape. According to The EastAfrican, Uganda was estimated to have between 4,000 and 6,000 troops deployed in Somalia under bilateral arrangements, in addition to approximately 4,500 personnel allocated to AUSSOM.
Ethiopia was also reported to have about 5,000 troops in Somalia under bilateral arrangements, alongside its allocation of 2,500 personnel to the AU mission.
The figures are estimates rather than independently verified troop totals.
The distinction between bilateral deployments and the AU mission is significant. While AUSSOM operates within a multilateral framework to support stabilisation and strengthen Somali security forces, bilateral deployments are governed by separate arrangements between national governments and Somalia.
Although the two approaches may complement each other, their command structures, operational priorities and logistical arrangements are not necessarily the same.
International involvement also extends to specialist military support. Photographs reported by The EastAfrican following operations in Lower Shabelle showed Somali and Ugandan troops alongside personnel from Bancroft Global Development, a contractor involved in training and mentoring Somali forces.
The presence of the personnel highlights the role of specialist support close to frontline operations, although it does not establish that they participated directly in combat.
The bilateral approach offers several operational advantages, including additional manpower, intelligence, training, logistics and air support that can help Somali forces disrupt insurgent positions and reclaim territory.
However, the growing number of foreign military partners also raises questions about how effectively their activities are coordinated and whether short-term battlefield gains can translate into lasting security.
One major challenge is maintaining control over recovered territory. This requires secure supply routes, capable Somali security forces, functioning local administration and public confidence to prevent insurgents from returning.
Without these elements, military victories may prove temporary, leaving communities vulnerable to renewed attacks.
AUSSOM’s future therefore remains central to Somalia’s security strategy. Its authorised troop strength must be distinguished from the number of personnel actually deployed and available for operations.
Preparations for Egypt’s participation were already under way in February 2026, although any proposed expansion of the mission must be assessed against confirmed decisions.
The central issue, according to Grounds, is how bilateral deployments can strengthen rather than undermine a coherent, Somali-led security strategy.
He noted that greater operational flexibility and international military assistance could deliver battlefield gains, but their long-term value would depend on effective coordination and the ability of Somali institutions to assume lasting responsibility for national security.
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Somalia’s experience in 2026 underscores the growing importance of bilateral military partnerships in the fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
Ultimately, the success of the approach will depend not simply on the territory recovered or the number of insurgents targeted, but on whether international support builds sustainable Somali security capabilities or deepens the country’s dependence on foreign forces.
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